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Summary
Smart and Connected Communities (SCC) is an emerging field of Internet of Things
(IoT), and it is having potential applications to improve human life. The improve-
ment may be in terms of preservation, revitalization, livability, and sustainability of
a community. The resources of the nodes and devices in the SCC have certain con-
straints that may not allow the devices and nodes to cooperate to save their resources
such as memory, energy, and buffer, or simply maximize their performance. Thus, to
stimulate the nodes to avoid selfish behavior, SSC needs a novel and well-organized
solution to motivate nodes for cooperation. This article aims to resolve the issue of
selfish behaviors in SCC and to encourage the nodes for cooperation. A novel mech-
anism Socially Omitting Selfishness (SOS) has been proposed to manage/eradicate
selfishness using a socially-oriented election process. The election process elects
different heads based on weight and cooperation (using VCG model). The election
of heads and incentive mechanism encourages the nodes to show participation and
behave as highly cooperative members of the community. Furthermore, an extended
version of the Dempster-Shafer model has been used to discourage the selfish behav-
ior of the participating nodes in the SOS scheme. It uses different monitoring and
gateway nodes to efficiently employ the proposed scheme. A mathematical model
has been developed for the aforementioned aspects and simulated through NS2 sim-
ulation environment to analyze the performance of SOS. The results of the proposed
scheme outperform the contemporary schemes in terms of average delivery delay,
packet delivery ratio, throughput, and average energy.
KEYWORDS:
Sustainability, IoT, Revitalization, Smart and connected communities, Social selfishness, Selfish behav-
iors,Incentive techniques
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of things (IoT) is an emerging area in modern communication networks. It consists of different devices (things) such
as machines, people, animals, and objects embedded with sensors and actuators1. Data sensed by these sensors and actuators
are relayed to remote servers for further processing. The processing time and storage capacity depends on the capabilities
0Abbreviations: SOS, Socially Omiting selfishness; IoT, Internet of Things; SCC, Smart and Connected Communities
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of IoT objects2,3,4,5,6,7,8. The advancements in IoT are influential on the smart and connected Communities (SCC). The main
considerations of the SCC are the present past and future of the major areas of society9,10. Aims and objectives of SCC are
the preservation, livability, revitalization, and sustainability of human life to make life easy by remembering the past of human
life, focus on present, and plan for a better future. The cultural heritage for communities is preserved and living needs are
referred to as livability11. Sustainability is the need of making plans for the future having three important pillars such as social,
environmental, and economic aspects12. The nodes in SCC can store and forward data to the destination hop by hop. It means
nodes need to be socially cooperative to relay data. However, some of the nodes adopt a selfish nature to save their resources.
Limited resources, preservation of bandwidth, manipulation, energy savings and other social behavior of the nodes make the
node self-centered and selfish. Selfishness may be categorized as individual and social13,14,15. The individual selfishness has
the same degree of selfishness with all other nodes that may not forward messages even to its neighbor. Social selfishness has a
different degree of selfishness because the relationship varies with all other nodes in the network. The nodes having a variable
relationship with neighbor nodes may forward messages to their friends, and refuse to forward messages to the strangers. The
selfish behavior of the node has an adverse effect on the throughput of the network and can affect the performance of the network
by losing connectivity16. In this article, the problem of selfishness either individual or social has been considered to design a
scheme that can omit the selfishness using a social mechanism of election in SCC.
There are many existing techniques such as the Game-theoretic reward-based system and the Cooperative Watchdog System
that addressed the issue of selfishness andmotivate node for cooperation. Different types of cards are assigned to nodes according
to their selfishness level in the first scheme. In the second scheme, a reputation score is assigned to each node. However, these
schemes have issues like (i) Individual importance factor problem: in17, only individual importance of a node is considered for
trust. (ii) monitoring nodes can be selfish: this scheme only monitors the behaviors of the selfish node. But monitoring node can
also be selfish as they give wrong information about the selfish or cooperative nodes (iii) strict punishment issue: the node can not
join the network once it has been punished18. Node Selfishness is omitted differently in proposed SOS scheme. It also monitors
the behavior of the monitoring nodes in the network that is ignored in the above two schemes. Another feature of the proposed
scheme is the computation of the collective trust of monitoring nodes. The collective trust called Collective Importance Factor
(CIF) is computed to entitled any monitoring node to be cooperative or selfish. It also gives a chance to the selfish node after
showing selfishness for the first time. A participating node can rejoin the network by making negative payment first. At last, the
node can be expelled from the network for showing selfish behavior repeatedly.
In this article, a new motivation system is presented called socially omitting selfishness. In this system, selfish nodes are
encouraged to take part in the election. SOS communities are headed by a different head, elected in the election process. The
different types of elected heads are community head (퐶퐻), monitoring head (푀퐻), and incentive head (퐼퐻). These community
heads are elected based on certain features such as number of votes they get in election, weight, and cooperation. Each of these
heads has their own duties in the community. The nodes that have malicious or selfish behaviors are fined. SOS schememotivates
the selfish nodes for cooperation in SCC. The primary contributions of the proposed SOS scheme in SCC are:
• To analyzed the selfish behavior of nodes in SCC both individually and socially. Furthermore, to analyze the effect of
nodes participating in the overall performance of the network.
• To design a novel strategy that motivates the non-cooperative nodes for participation within the community to improve
network performance in SCC.
• To formulate criteria taking into account certain parameters like weight and cooperation that can be used to elect various
heads such as Community Head, Monitoring Head, and Incentive Head.
• To develop a mechanism for solving the weight tie issue by adding cooperation as a parameter for the next nomination
criteria in the election of heads in the election process.
• To introduce an effective monitoring scheme that constantly monitors the selfish behavior of the nodes to calculate the
Collective Importance Factor (CIF) and track the behavior of the monitoring head as well to avoid any discriminatory
behavior on the part of the monitoring head itself.
• To perform comparative analysis of the proposed scheme, different incentive-based schemes are compared with the pro-
posed scheme to gauge the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of improving human livability, revitalization,
improved packet delivery ratio, average delivery delay, and energy constraint.
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The remaining of the paper is organized in the following sections: Section 2 discusses related works. Section 3 shows the
detailed design of SOS. Section 4 shows the performance evaluation of the proposed SOS scheme. The paper is concluded and
future work is discussed in section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
SCC has the number of nodes that are selfish and non-cooperative in nature. The selfish behavior of the nodes has been widely
examined and is highly interested in the researchers. Selfish nodes are degrading the overall performance of the network19. The
incentive-based techniques are implemented to encourage the selfish nodes for cooperation and share its resources altruistically
with other nodes in the network20,21. The incentive-based technique is further classified into four classes such as reputation-
based, game-theoretic-based, credit-based and barter-based system.
The reputation-based motivation system depends on the degree of node cooperation within the network. Compared to non-
cooperative nodes, cooperative nodes are extremely appreciated. The credit-based scheme operates to give the nodes some
benefits for showing cooperation. The nodes can subsequently utilize this awarded credit for their purpose later. Barter-based
motivation systems, also known as the Tit-For-Tat (TFT) approach, where nodes share the same information.
Yuxin et al.22 proposed a game-based incentive scheme. Two types of relationship such as competitive and cooperative are
considered. To motivate the nodes for cooperation, a contribution measurement is given during the game. Annalisa et al.23
proposed a social scheme called SORSI for detecting selfishness and encourage the selfish nodes for data forwarding. Ning et
al.24 proposed a CAIS scheme to discourage selfishness in social networks. In this scheme, social interactions among nodes
make communities in the network. The nodes are rewarded two types of credit namely social credit and non-social credit for
data forwarding within the same communities or different communities.
Wang et al.25 proposed a hop limited flooding scheme to tackle the issue of selfishness in Delay Tolerant Networks. Jedari
et al.26 proposed a social-based watchdog system to detect selfish nodes in an opportunistic mobile network. This scheme
differentiates the degree of the selfishness of the nodes because the punishment and rewarding process employed to encourage
nodes might not be the same for all nodes in the network. Wang et al.27 presented an incentive approach to resolve the issue of
selfishness in the urban environment. Seregina et al.28 addressed the issue of selfishness by proposes a reward-based mechanism
to motivate the mobile nodes for cooperation.
Lu et al.29 proposed a Geographic information and node selfish-based scheme to tackle the problem of selfishness. To choose
a decent next-hop relay node, the readiness of the relay node is merged with geographic informations. Wei et al.30 proposed
a community-based and reputation-based incentive scheme to motivate a selfish node to take part in data forwarding. In this
scheme each node can retain, update and show reputation for verification whenever necessary. The critical factor in this scheme
is the altruism function that kicks out selfish nodes.
In the research article17, the author presents a game theoretical reward-based system to manage selfish nodes in the network.
Dias et al.18 proposed a cooperative watchdog system to tackle the issue of selfishness by assigning a reputation score to all nodes
in the network. Fawaz et al.31 proposed an incentive mechanism to motivate the selfish nodes for cooperation in the vehicular
networks. In the research article32, the author proposed a barter-based scheme to resolve the issue of selfishness in the network.
Liu et al.33 also proposed the barter-based scheme among different communities to encourage selfish nodes for taking part in
message forwarding.
Li et al.34 proposed a Social scheme to manage selfishness in the network. In a social community or group, the nodes with
strong social interactions with one another are likely willing to forward data. In the research article35, the author proposed an
incentive system to manage selfish nodes in vehicular networks. In this scheme, an incentive is given as a reward to the nodes
for sharing different information. The provided information is related to the construction of roads, traffic congestion, and road
accidents. In36, the author proposed stable and reliable data dissemination that forward data to other nodes in the network
intelligently. Sobin et al.37 proposed a selfishness and buffer-aware routing (SBR) to deal with the issue of selfishness. Yamini et
al.38 proposed an advanced collaborative mechanism to deal with the problem of selfishness inMobile Ad hoc network. Ganesan
et al39 proposed Semi Markov process inspired selfish aware cooperative scheme (SMPISCS) for wireless sensor networks In
this scheme, selfish nodes are encouraged for cooperation in the network. Muhammed et al.40 presented Game Theory-Based
Cooperation for Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks. In this scheme, the selfish nodes are motivated for showing cooperation
in the network. Terence et al.41 proposed behavior based routing misbehavior detection (BRMD) for wireless sensor networks to
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identify false advertiser node in the network. In this scheme, the sensor nodes are constantly monitored by the neighbor nodes.
In smart and connected communities environment, safe and stable communication is required42.
Thus, SOS is a socially-oriented system that is used to forward data to the participating nodes in SCC depending on social
interaction among nodes. Election scheme is used by SOS to encourage the selfish nodes for participation in a network. During
the election, the elected heads motivate the selfish nodes for cooperation in a community. Nodes are given some incentive for
their cooperative behaviors with other nodes that have greatly improved the performance of the network. Table 1 provide the
comparison of SOS with some existing Schemes.
TABLE 1 Comparison of SOS with some Existing Schemes
Paper and Authors Contributions Limitations Comparison with SOS
Umar et.al17 A game-theoretical reward-
based system to manage
selfish nodes in the network.
Different types of cards are
assigned to nodes according
to their selfishness level in
scheme.
Individual importance factor
problem: Only the individ-
ual importance of a node is
considered for trust. Moni-
toring nodes can be selfish:
This scheme only monitors
the behaviors of the selfish
node.
Collective Importance Fac-
tor (CIF) is computed to
entitled anymonitoring node
to be cooperative or selfish.
It also monitors the behav-
ior of the monitoring nodes
in the network
Dias et al.18 Proposed a cooperative
watchdog system to tackle
the issue of selfishness by
assigning a reputation score
to all nodes in the network.
Strict punishment issue: the
node can not join the net-
work once it has been pun-
ished.
It only detects Selfish nodes.
Node Selfishness is omit-
ted in the proposed SOS
scheme. Nodes are get
warned for showing selfish
behavior for the first time.
Terence et al.41 Proposed behavior-based
routing misbehavior detec-
tion (BRMD) for wireless
sensor networks to identify
false advertiser node in the
network.
No punishment scheme is
defined for selfish nodes
by showing selfish behavior
repeatedly.
A Proper punishment
scheme is defined in the
SOS scheme.
Lo et al.43 Proposed a multi-head clus-
tering algorithm in vehicular
ad hoc networks to handle
the issue of selfishness
Weight tie Problem: when
the weights of two nodes
are the same, then there is
no alternate criteria to elect
heads in the election.
Cooperation is considered
as the next criteria to elect
heads during election
3 SYSTEMMODEL
The proposed scheme SOS relies primarily on node involvement in the network. Nodes in the community have various
performance-related activities, like forwarding of messages, monitoring, and tracking of nodes in the community. These activ-
ities are considered to be the main duties of the participating nodes in the election process. The nodes in the community are
motivated to participate and function as a unit. One of the important features of the community-based node is to monitor the
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behavior of the neighbor node. This characteristic of a node provides complete control over the message transmitting and receiv-
ing. Therefore, an incentive system in the shape of reputation is suggested to encourage and stimulate the nodes to accomplish
their tasks in the network by the proposed scheme. Nodes with malicious or selfish behaviors are motivated to engage in the vot-
ing system and act as cooperative nodes. Selfish nodes are also punished in the form of removal from the community for showing
malicious behaviors repeatedly. This punishment message is broadcasted in the community regarding such nodes. Since the pro-
posed system is divided into two phases such as election scheme and payment method. Thus, the nodes initiate involvement in
the election process which establishes the election process.
The community is controlled through the election process periodically. During the voting system, different heads are elected
on the basis of higher weight, cooperation and a higher percentage of votes in the election. A node receiving a greater amount
of votes, weight, and cooperation are elected as CH, second as MH, and third as IH. Election table is used to keep the records
of all elected heads. The proposed scheme is applicable in IoT for smart and connected communities. Nodes are encouraged to
cooperate with one another and due to this, selfishness is omitted which improves the livability, preservation, revitalization, and
attainability of the community. The selfishness and cooperative nature of the nodes are determined by monitoring nodes through
some trust value. The range of the trust value is in [0,1]. Nodes having a trust value greater than 0.5 is considered as cooperative
and if the trust value is less than 0.5 then it is considered as selfish. Table 2 lists the notations used in the proposed scheme.
TABLE 2 Notations
Notation Description and Explanation
푥 It is the elected Community Head 퐶퐻 during the election process on
the basis of higher votes, weight, and cooperation
푐푝푥 Contacts of the node 푥 with other nodes in the community
푊푥 Weight of node 푥 shows the remaining resource it possesses
푉 푡푥 Node 푘 voted for community head 퐶퐻
푀푥 Monitoring node that constantly monitors the behavior of the nodes in
the community
푃푓 Fixed Payment that is given to nodes for their cooperative behaviors
퐹푏 Fixed Payment for each node that participates in the community election
Ψ푥 Per member payment
퐼퐹푥 Importance Factor shows the honesty of node 푥
3.1 Election Participation Payment
The proposed system SOS forward information in the community. The method starts with the involvement of nodes in the voting
phase. The method of community formation and maintenance is an outreach for this article and therefore not discussed here.
Table 3 lists some of the important variables that are used in the proposed scheme.
3.1.1 Election Procedure
The first phase of SOS conducts the election process based on certain eligibility criteria. Two properties such as weight and
cooperation of nodes are eligibility requirements. Nodes are nominated for the election that has greater (remaining) weight and
cooperation. The weight is simply the total amount of resources a node possesses.
Energy Ratio (퐸푥): The SCC devices are resource-constrained. Therefore, energy is also limited. Let 퐸푥 be the energy and is
provided by:
퐸푥 =
퐸푟푥
퐸푚푎푥푥
× 100% (1)
Where the current remaining energy of node 푥 is 퐸푟푥 and highest energy of node 푥 is 퐸푚푎푥푥.
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TABLE 3 Introduction of some key variables
Variables Description
푊 푒푖푔ℎ푡 Weight is the number of remaining resources a node possesses.
퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛 Nodes are regarded as cooperative if they make contacts with the more
nodes in the community i.e 푐푝푥 > 푘 where 푘 = ⌈ 푛3⌉.
푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠 To measure selfishness of the node, nodes with contact 푐푝푥 ≤ 푘 are
declared as selfish.
푅푒푝푢푡푎푡푖표푛 Reputation of the monitoring nodes is calculated on its honest behavior
in the network.
퐶퐼퐹푅푢푙푒 The Collective Importance Factor preludes the monitoring nodes from
making prejudice decision about the node having a mutual relationship
prior to it.
Buffer Ratio (퐵푥): The space in buffer is decreased by storing more data in it. Where 퐵푥 is the proportion of the remaining
buffer that reflects the node position in the buffer. The remaining status of the buffer is provided by:
퐵푥 =
퐵푟푥
퐵푚푎푥푥
× 100% (2)
Where 퐵푟푥 is the remaining buffer of the node 푥 presently and 퐵푚푎푥푥is the highest buffer.
Remaining Time-To-Live (푇푇퐿): 푇푇퐿 is related to the delivery of a bundle. Each node should forward bundle before its
푇푇퐿 is expired. Node is not considered for payment after its 푇푇퐿 is expired. The status of node in the form of 푇푇퐿 is given by:
푇 푥퐼퐷푚 =
푇푇퐿푟푥
푇푇퐿
× 100% (3)
where 푇 푥퐼퐷푚 is the remaining 푇푇퐿 of bundle 퐼퐷푚 carried by node 푥 presently and 푇푇퐿푟푥 is the remaining 푇푇퐿 of the bundle.Node Degree푁퐷푥: This indicates the number of nodes as neighboring nodes in the node 푥 transmission range.
푁퐷푥 =
∑
푦∈푛,푦≠푥
{
푦 ∣ 푑푖푠(푥, 푦) < 푇푟푎푛푔푒
} (4)
Relative Distance (푅퐷푥): By43, the SCC nodes have certain features of how near they are to each other. Each node computes
its own proximity to the mean distance and is provided by the formula given below:
푅퐷푥 =∣푝표푠 −휔푝표푠 ∣=
√
((푋푥 −푋휔)2 + (푌푥 − 푌휔)2) (5)
In the given equation, 푥푝표푠 indicates the location of 푥, the mean location of any node with its neighbors of 푥 is depicted by 휔푝표푠
, (푋푥, 푌푥) is the 푋 and 푌 coordinates of node 푥 and (푋휔, 푌휔), shows the coordinate of 휔 position. Once the results of all five
characteristics are computed, their weight is determined by:
푊푥 = 퐸푥.푤푡1 + 퐵푥.푤푡2 + 푇 푥퐼퐷푚 .푤푡3 +푁퐷푥.푤푡4 + 푅퐷푥.푤푡5 (6)
where푊푥 is the node 푥 weight, the weights (푤푡1, 푤푡2, 푤푡3, 푤푡4, 푤푡5) are randomly chosen, where the absolute weight is equiv-
alent to 1 comparable to 44. The scenario where the weight of two node is same, then cooperation is adopted as the next criteria
for nomination of nodes for election. Cooperation is provided by:
푐푝푥 =
∑
푛∈푁
푅푐푥(푛), 푖푓푐푝푥 > 푘 (7)
Where 푘 = ⌈ 푛
3
⌉, 푐푝푥 is the node 푥 cooperation, all nodes in the community is 푛 and 푅푐푥 is node 푥 total contacts. Nodes
are regarded as cooperative if they make contacts with the more nodes in the community i.e 푐푝푥 > 푘. To measure selfishness
of the node, nodes with contact 푐푝푥 ≤ 푘 are declared as selfish. Node with greater weight and cooperation is nominated as
an election candidate. The node makes communication in its range for a short duration. There is a chance that the information
given by the node may be incorrect in terms of its weight and cooperation. A node may illustrate its weight as underweight and
overweight. The underweight illustration will prevent it from being elected as community head and the overweight will offer it
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some opportunities to become a leader of the community. VCG model is used to develop and increase the trust behavior of the
nodes within the community. The aim of this model is to expose the incorrect information regarding the nodeweight. Algorithm 1
provides the details of the election procedure. In this algorithm, nodes are nominated for election based on two characteristics
weight and cooperation. The nodes having higher weight and cooperation are nominated for election. After nomination, heads
such as community Head 퐶퐻 , monitoring Head푀퐻 , and Incentive Head 퐼퐻 are elected in the election by getting a higher
number of votes. All the nodes that participated in the election are also awarded some sort of payment. Election table is used
which contains all the record of the nodes that participated in the election.
Algorithm 1 Election procedure & Payment to participating nodesAlgorithm 5 Election Process& Payment to participa ts during Election
Require: Number of nodes n
Ensure: Election Process& Payment to participants during Election
1: for x = 1 : n do
2: Compute and broadcast Wx and cpx
3: for all k ∈ n do
4: Nominate node max(wk) and node max(cpk) for election
5: end for
6: After election votes are counted and nodes such as CH, MH and IH are
elected
7: CH calculate Pm =
∑
k∈n(V tCH(W,k)) × (Fb) × (Ψch) and Cost Cs =
1
WCH
∗ (Wy −WCH)
∑
k∈n(V tCH(W,k))× (Fb)×ΨCH)
8: CH new reputation, Rp(CH) = Rp(CH) + Pm(CH)− Cs(CH)
9: for all k, k is not CH in community do
10: new reputation Rp(k) = Rp(k) + Pm(k)
11: end for
12: for all k ∈ n do
13: broadcast CHACK=V tCH(k) ‖ Pm(k) ‖ Rp(k)
14: end for
15: Update Election Table
16: end for
4
3.1.2 Vickrey, Clarke, and Goves (VCG) Approach
Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves (VCG) is a helpful technique that utilizes game theory tools. This model is used to demonstrate
the behaviors of all nodes within the network and also encourage the node to tell the truth45. Let 푃 be all the members of
VCG model, where each member 푚 ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...푛} has some personal information 휃푚, known as member type. Let 푍푚 ∈ Θ
be any strategy that a member 푚 can use to input in a mechanism. Let 푃 = {푃1, 푃2, 푃3, ..., 푃푛} be the specific payment vector.
To calculate explicit payment vector 푃 = {푃1, 푃2, 푃3, ..., 푃푛}, the VCG model takes input from all the members to generate
overall output 푂 = 푂{푍1, 푍2..., 푍푛}. The output generated shows the preference of each node as cost function 퐶푚 = (Θ, 푂).
The handling of such information shows the usefulness of each member as calculated by cost function 푈푚 = 푃푚 − 퐶푚(휃푚, 푂).
To cope with the features of SCC, a slight modification is made to the present model in this article. Previously, only the
energy level of a node was considered as its persona data. To illustrate the energy level of a node, the truth-telling behavior of
the VCG model was used46. Here in the proposed scheme, the energy level of a node and as well as some other parameters such
as buffer ratio, message 푇푇퐿, relative distance and node degree are considered as the weight of a node. The individual personal
information of a node is the weight of a node. Every node is awarded a real number called reputation value that depends on the
reward or penalty a node receives from the community head. Nodes reputation improves or reduces after every voting process
and is dependent on nodes cooperation within the network.
3.1.3 Post Election Payment Based on VCGModel
There are 푛 nodes in the game. Each node is a community player. The nodes in the contest or game need to disclose their weight
to initiate the electoral process. In the election process, some nodes are elected as heads and recognize others as participants.
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Payment in the shape of reputation is made to both elected heads and participants. Every node in the contest tries to improve its
reputation푅. Higher reputation nodes get more network utilities. A reputation table known as푅푇푎푏푙푒 is maintained by each node
in the community. This table has all the details regarding the reputation of the neighbors and it is modified whenever necessary.
Algorithm 2 provides the details of the payment process and operations of all heads elected in the election. In this algorithm,
the monitoring nodes are assigned the responsibility to constantly check the behaviors of neighbor nodes in the community. The
incentive head is responsible for making payment to the nodes. Nodes are awarded some incentive for showing cooperation in
the community. But for showing selfish behavior in the community, nodes are also punished. Sometime Monitoring nodes can
also be selfish. In such cases, 퐶퐻 also computes the Importance factor of all monitoring nodes.
Algorithm 2 Operational Phase & Packet forwarding Payment Process
Require: Number of nodes n
Ensure: Operational Phase & Payment Process of packet forwarding
1: for x = 1 : n do
2: Assign four monitoring nodes M1,M2,M3 and M4
3: if cpx > k, where k = dn3 e then
4: behavior = Cooperative;
5: send t(report) =′ Cooperative′
6: else if cpx ≤ k then
7: behavior = Selfish;
8: t(report) =′ Selfish′
9: end if
10: CH compute IF of monitoring nodes Mx
11: IFx =
Rx
Σ4x=1Rx
12: M(self) = M
′(self)
Σnx=1M
′(self) and M(Coop) =
M ′(Coop)
Σnx=1M
′(Coop)
13: if Mcoop > Mself then
14: grant Pm(r) = Rp(r) + Pf
15: grant Pm(r) = Rp(r)− Pf
16: end if
17: if treport(Mx) = tfinal then
18: grant Pm(Mx) = RP (Mx) + Pm(M)
19: else
20: grant Pm(Mx) = Rp(Mx)− Pm(M)
21: update RTable
22: end if
23: end for
3
A. Community Head (퐶퐻) Payment
After the completion of the election process, every node in the network gets its payment. The payment to the 퐶퐻 is made based
on the votes given to it by the participating nodes. All the nodes in a community election process that voted for 퐶퐻 are awarded
incentive that is considered as the cost of the 퐶퐻 elected in the election. The cost vector that is actually the weight of a node
is expressed by 푊1,푊2, ....,푊푛, where 푛 is the number of nodes in total. The differentiation between receiving and making
incentive is the 퐶퐻 profit.
푃푚(푥) =
∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푥(푊 ,푘)) × (퐹푏) × (Ψ푥) (8)
Where (푉 푡푥(푊 ,푘) in the election scheme generates particular value (equals 1 if 푘 votes for 푥, 0 is produced otherwise). The 퐼퐻
also determines particular fixed budget퐹푏 for each node involved in election (this payment is well-know and fixed to all nodes)
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and Ψ푥 is node payment as provided below:
Ψ푥 = 푊푥 +
1∑
푘∈푛 푉 푡푥(푊 ,푘)
× (
∑
푙∈푛
(푊푦)). ×
∑
푘∈푛
푉 푡푦(푊 |푊푥 = ∞, 푘) −∑
푦∈푛
(푊푦)∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푦(푊 ,퐾)) (9)
B. Community Members Payment
On the basis of fixed payment 퐹푏, the absolute cost of the nodes is shared among all the nodes by the 퐶퐻 (nodes that gave the
vote). The cost function 퐶표푠푡푥 determined by 퐶퐻푥 is given under:
퐶푠(푥) =
1
푊푥
∗ (푊푦 −푊푥)
∑
푘∈푛
(푉 푡푥(푊 ,푘)) × (퐹푏) × Ψ푥 (10)
where푊푥 and푊푦 indicate the maximum and second maximum nodes weights of the node involved in the election process. The
elected heads in a community deducted the absolute cost from their payment to calculate their own reputation.
푅푝(푥) = 푃푚(푥) − 퐶푠(푥) (11)
The absolute cost of the nodes is shared among them depending on the nodes reputation. The 퐶퐻 announces a payment to
member nodes through some 퐶퐻푎푐푘 notification. The messages are signed and checked using standard message authentication.
Each of the nodes updates the 푅푇푎푏푙푒.
3.2 Packet Forwarding Payment in a Community
The 퐶퐻 and Gateway nodes are constrained for forwarding of messages only acting as relay nodes. The relay nodes may
not forward some packets by showing selfish behavior. Such selfish behaviors of a node in SCC have undesirable effects on
community performance. It also manipulates community nodes disconnection and added to the percentage of packet drop ratio.
Each node receives an incentive for message forwarding in the form of reputation44. The monitoring nodes that control the
function of relay nodes make the payment scheme more efficient.
3.2.1 Payment for Relay Nodes in a Community
Payment is made to the node for each packet forwarding in the proposed scheme. The incentive head makes a fixed payment
푝푓 to the nodes in the network. This 푃푓 is made on the cooperative behavior of the nodes. Therefore, the monitoring system
is presented, that collects impervious of all monitoring nodes. These evidences contribute to the computation of the decision-
making behavior of the relay nodes.
A. Collective Trust of Monitoring Nodes in a Community
In the proposed scheme, a relay contains four monitoring nodes. In these four monitoring nodes, one of them is monitoring head
that is elected in the election process. The other three monitoring nodes are participating nodes picked in a round-robin mode.
A packet hash 47 is generated by each node to maintain the packet genuine and prevent the packet from being changed by the
forwarder. Furthermore, the hash score of the forwarded packet will be verified when the packet arrives at the next relay node.
It ensures that the packet sent will be consistent whenever the hash results match. In a case, when hash results do not match,
then the relay node is labeled as selfish and collect a negative reward. Each node keeps a record of the forwarded packets in its
buffer. These packets will be sent next after some expected lifetime. The monitoring node generates a trust report regarding the
behavior of nodes after certain threshold time period. The trust report specifies nodes intentions to forward messages. The trust
report shows the behavior of the nodes as selfish or cooperative. The four monitoring nodes send a report to 퐶퐻 to compute the
trust value. If the Collective trust assessment of the cooperative nodes surpasses the malicious conduct, the forwarder is labeled
genuine and receives favorable payment (reputation) otherwise selfish nodes will receive negative payment after repeatedly
showing selfish behavior (punishment). To obtain comparable outcomes (avoid inconsistent results), the Collective Importance
Factor (CIF) principle is presented to compute the trust depends on evidence from distinct nodes.
B. Use of Extended Dempster-Shafer to Merge Evidences
The Dempster-Shafer uses mathematical formulas to resolve uncertainty situations in a network48,49. This model is primarily
used in finding routing attacks in mobile ad hoc networks45 and for calculation of collective trust. The evidence theory is
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calculated by 훿, which is a frame of judgment and probability assignment function BPA44. A frame of judgment 훿 shows a
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypothesis, showing only one of them is true. BPA function shows 푏 ∶ 2훿 ←← [0, 1] satisfying
two of the condition:
푏(∅) = 0 (12)
and ∑
퐴⊆휗
푏(퐴) = 1 (13)
Where 휗 is null set having A is any subset of 훿 to calculate two BPA functions 푏1 and 푏2, the DS theory gives the following rule:
푏(퐶) =
∑
퐴∩퐵=퐶 푏1(퐴)푏2(퐵)
1 −
∑
퐴∩퐵=∅ 푏1(퐴)푏2(퐵)
(14)
The limitations of DS theory has that it treat all the evidences equal and the priorities of the evidences are not considered.
50 has introduced the importance factor IF in the proposed Extended Dempster-Shafer (EDS) rule. Where IF is a real number
calculated on the basis of the importance of evidence. 50 defines basic probability assignment rules for two importance factor
퐼퐹1 and 퐼퐹2 having 퐸푉1 and 퐸푉2 evidences:
푏(퐶, 퐼퐹푥, 퐼퐹푤) =
∑
퐴푥∩퐵푥=퐶
[
(푏1(퐴푥)
퐼퐹푥
퐼퐹푤 푏2(퐵푤)
퐼퐹푤
퐼퐹푥
]
∑
퐶⊆휃,퐶¬=∅,
∑
퐴푥∩퐵푥=퐶
[
(푏1(퐴푥)
퐼퐹푥
퐼퐹푤 푏2(퐵푤)
퐼퐹푤
퐼퐹푥
] (15)
However, in some situations, both DS and EDS theories generate output which is irrational51.
C. Trust Calculation Based on Collective Importance Factor
The Collective importance factor preludes the monitoring nodes frommaking prejudice decision about the node having a mutual
relationship prior to it. It may declare the node as selfish and punish it. Thus, an importance factor that distinguish between
honest and dishonest monitoring nodes in a community is essential. The reputation of the monitoring nodes is calculated on its
honest behavior in the network. Monitoring nodes importance factor is its honesty. The 퐼퐹 of monitoring nodes 푥 is equal to
the reputational score over the actual reputational score of all monitoring nodes in the community. 퐼퐹푥 indicates the importance
factor of monitoring node x and 푅1, 푅2, 푅3, and 푅4 are the four monitoring nodes taking part in a relay.
퐼퐹푥 =
푅푥
Σ4푥=1푅푥
(16)
Implicitly if any node 푥 report the behavior of any node 푦, the accurate or genuine judgment is equal to the importance factor
(퐼퐹 ) of a node reporting the behavior of a node. Any node 푥 having an 퐼퐹푥 report that node 푥 is cooperative.
푀푥(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖푣푒) = 퐼퐹푥 (17)
푀푥(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ) = 1 − 퐼퐹푥 (18)
In a similar manner, if any node 푤 reported 푘 as non-cooperated or selfish then
푀푤(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ) = 퐼퐹푤 (19)
푀푤(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖푣푒) = 1 − 퐼퐹푤 (20)
The CIF rule calculates the collective trust as under. Suppose (퐴, 푏1), (퐵, 푏2)....(푁, 푏푛) are two discrete evidence produced by
푛 watchdog having 퐼퐹1, 퐼퐹2 and 퐼퐹푛 as an importance factor. 퐸푉1, 퐸푉2....퐸푉푘 shows 푘 combination of elements in 훿 given in
Eq(21). For each 퐸푉푤, 푤 ∈ 푘 we associate a value 푏′(퐸푉푤) as,
푏′(퐸푉푤) =
푛∑
푥=1
푏푥(퐸푉푤)
퐼퐹푥
Σ푛푖=1,푖≠푥퐼퐹푖 −
푛∏
푥=1
푏푥(퐸푉푤)
퐼퐹푥
Σ푛푖=1,푖≠푥퐼퐹푖 (21)
Finally, BPA is assigned to 퐸푉푥 as,
푏(퐸푉푤) =
푏′(퐸푉푤)
Σ푛푥=1푏′(퐸푉푤)
(22)
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D. Descriptive instance of Collective Importance Factor Rule
Consider four monitoring nodes 푀1,푀2,푀2, and 푀4 with a reputation score of 70, 30, 10 and 40 respectively produce a
forwarder trust report on 푛표푑푒1. The 푛표푑푒1 is cooperative according to the report of 푀1. However, 푀2, 푀3 and 푀4 report
푛표푑푒1 is not cooperative. So, the importance factors 퐼퐹1, 퐼퐹2, 퐼퐹3, and 퐼퐹4 of the four monitoring nodes are calculated for
their total reputation score as, 70
100
= 0.7, 30
100
= 0.3, 10
100
= 0.1, and 40
100
= 0.4 respectively. Thus,
푀1(푐표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = 0.7 푀1(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = 0.3
푀2(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = 0.3 푀2(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = 0.7
푀3(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = 0.1 푀3(푐표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = 0.9
푀4(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = 0.4 푀4(푐표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = 0.6
Subsequently, the collective trust value on node 1 is computed as,
푀 ′(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = (0.3)
0.7
0.3 + (0.3)
0.3
0.7 + (0.1)
0.1
0.9 + (0.4)
0.4
0.6 − (0.3)
0.7
0.3 (0.3)
0.3
0.7 (0.1)
0.1
0.9 (0.4)
0.4
0.6 = 1.95
푀 ′(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = (0.7)
0.7
0.3 + (0.7)
0.3
0.7 + (0.9)
0.1
0.9 + (0.6)
0.4
0.6 − (0.7)
0.7
0.3 (0.7)
0.3
0.7 (0.9)
0.1
0.9 (0.6)
0.4
0.6 = 2.73
Therefore,푀(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) and푀(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) can be computed as,
푀(푆푒푙푓푖푠ℎ푛푒푠푠) = 1.95
1.95+2.73
= .416
푀(퐶표표푝푒푟푎푡푖표푛) = 2.73
1.95+2.73
= .583
The evidences provided by all the nodes in the network will decide the honesty of the forwarder for making payment. CIF
principle decides the selfish and cooperative nature of nodes. The CIF rule states as if three monitoring nodes declare a node
selfish but the final trust calculated is less than the fourth one, the node will still be cooperative. This implies the node having
cooperative nature for a long time has its importance. As of final calculation, the new reputation is computed from the nodes
given incentive and contemporary reputation, and it is broadcasted by the 퐶퐻 .
3.2.2 Monitoring Nodes Payment in a Community
Monitoring nodes are paid for submitting trustworthy reports. The 퐶퐻 is making the payment to the monitoring node based
on some trust score. Monitoring nodes trustworthiness is determined by the final score. For (푃푚(푀) > 0), implies that the
monitoring nodes are trustworthy as the final trust score matches the trust report. For (푃푚(푀) < 0), implies that the final trust
value has a deviation from the trust value and termed the node as misbehavior monitoring node.
Some changes have been made to the new model to handle the devices in the community. Therefore, the nodes weight is
regarded as individual personal information that is one of the eligibility requirements for participation in the process of election.
In addition, a nodes reputation is a real number allocated to each participating node calculated on node behavior. This value
varies according to the truth-telling behavior of the nodes in the network.
3.2.3 Reputation Carry and Forward
At first, all nodes have zero reputation as they join the network. The reputation of the nodes varies during the electoral phase.
This is reported by the 퐶퐻 periodically to the nodes in the network. Node switches its position to 퐺푊 as it gets updates from
퐶퐻 . The node constantly updates the푅푇푎푏푙푒with other퐶퐻 as it gets updated in푅푡푎푏푙푒 in either community. Community head
in the network confirms the accuracy and integrity of the information transmitted by 퐺푊 node. It affirms that the 퐶퐻 knows
about the information about two hope communities in both directions. For instance, there are three communities namely 퐴,퐵,
and 퐶 . Suppose a new node푋 is joining the community 퐵. Community 퐵 apprehend all the reputation score of all the nodes in
퐴 and 퐶 as per the proposed scheme. Thus, the reputation score of the node푋 is recognized to the community 퐵 even before it
joins 퐵. If the 퐶퐻 is unsure of the new node reputation score, a new node will be recognized as a new node within a network.
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3.3 Selfish Nodes Punishment in a Community
Community head stimulates the selfish nodes to take an active part in the election process. This participation in election process
labels them as cooperative nodes. The head of the community can punish the nodes with selfish behavior in three ways. The
community head stimulates the node to cooperate after being selfish for the first time but in such case, no incentive is awarded.
Secondly, a node receives negative payment after warning from the community heads. Finally, the community heads can remove
the selfish nodes from the community as punishment for a certain time. But sometimes a node can enter the network again and
act cooperatively, so in such scenario, the negative payment should be paid first.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section outlines the performance of SOS in Network Simulator NS-2.3452,53 by comparing it with current algorithms. NS-
2 is a network simulator for both wired and wireless networks. MANET routing protocols can be implemented in NS-2. Here,
the simulation setup and metrics are presented first and then simulation results are discussed.
4.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation is performed in six modules. The first module shows how the reputation of nodes changes with selfish nodes
variation. It is presented in the simulation during the election process. The second module show nodes behavior changes with
respect to its variation in reputation. In the third module, the results for the CAIS protocol is obtained based on our setup. In the
fourth module, we examined the SSAR protocol. The fifth module is about the proposed scheme. In CAIS, SSAR, and SOS, 4%
selfish nodes are injected in it. The results are compared and evaluated in the sixth module. The variations in the selfish nodes
are used as tools to test all three protocols. The system is assumed to be normal under 0% selfish nodes, which means that all the
nodes are cooperative in nature. The selfish nodes are variable ranging from 4% to 90% in the network during the simulation.
SSAR protocol is used as a benchmark. The simulation parameters are given in Table 4.
TABLE 4 Parameters values for Simulation
Parameter Values
Area 500 × 500푚2
Base Protocols CAIS, SSAR
Number of nodes 50
Node Distribution Uniform
Initial Energy 90
푅푥 Power 0.3
푇푥 Power 0.6
Movement Trace OFF
Malicious Activity 4%,10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90%
Comparison CAIS, SSAR with selfish nodes (Proposed Work)
Size of Packet Header 4 bytes
Address Size 4 bytes
Max. number of messages/packet 4bytes
Traffic Source CBR
Packet Protocol TCP
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4.2 Metrics
The simulation uses throughput, average delivery delay, average energy consumption, and packet delivery ratio (PDR) as metrics
of performance in a network. Throughput54 is the number of successfully delivered packets to the total packets. The packet
delivery ratio34 is the successful delivery of the messages over generated messages. The average delivery delay24 is defined as
the time is taken by the message to reach its destination. Energy consumption55 of the individual nodes to energy consumption
by the entire number of nodes is called average energy. SOS is compared with the following protocols: CAIS: A Copy Adjustable
Incentive Scheme24 and Social selfishness Aware Routing (SSAR)34. Both CAIS and SSAR are an incentive-based and social
scheme that handles the issue of selfishness. Thus, these two schemes are used as a benchmark for SOS.
4.3 Results and Discussion
The nodes get payments through VCG model. Nodes involved in the election are paid for exhibiting cooperation in the network
and become community head, monitoring head and Incentive head via the election process. The nodes with selfish behavior or
action and not exhibiting the desired duty receive negative payments as punishment.
4.3.1 Variation of Reputation
The behavior of nodes has an effect on the reputation of the nodes. Reputation of nodes varies with its behavior. A node can be
selfish and cooperative, determined by its behavior in the network. The variation in node behavior is shown in figure 1a in the
election process.
 
(a) Total reputation of nodes with modifying selfish nodes
 
(b) Variation in Reputation over the simulation time
FIGURE 1 Total reputation of nodes with modifying selfish nodes & Variation in Reputation over the simulation time
The final simulation results show that participated nodes are decreased as the selfish nodes increases during the election
process. It also generates lesser payments to the selfish nodes by the heads of the community. Figure 1b shows the behavior of
the node in the election process. The reputation of the nodes in the network increases with an increase in cooperation and gets
decreased as the number of selfish nodes increased. The ratio of reputation is higher in the cooperative nodes than the selfish
nodes reputation as shown in the simulation results. Variation in the reputation ratio is due to the payment of incentives to the
nodes that varies during the election process. It depends on the actively participating nodes in the network. Fixed payment to the
relay node and monitoring nodes is made based on node behavior to forward messages to its neighbor. It implies that the nodes
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reputation increases with an increase in the participating nodes in the electoral process and number of the message forwarded
by the node to its neighbor. The reputation of the nodes decreased when negative payments are made to the node.
4.3.2 Comparison for Injecting 4% Selfish Nodes
The routing performance is studied in terms of packet delivery ratio, throughput, average delay, and average energy consumption
when 4% of nodes are selfish. Figure 2a shows the results of the performance metrics packet delivery ratio. The SOS technique
gains the highest packet delivery ratios of the packets. At pause time 8 sec, the SOS has the highest packet delivery ratio of 0.9
(packet sent/rec) that is approximately 25% and 27% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Figure 2b, 2c and 2d show the
results of the performance metrics, throughput, average delivery delay, and average energy consumption. At pause time 8 sec, the
throughput of SOS is 221 kbps that is 37% and 78% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. At pause time 10 sec, the average
delay of SOS is 14.67 ms that is 50% lower than CAIS and 23% lower than SSAR. In addition, the average energy consumed by
SOS is 12.77 joule at pause time 4 sec that is 14% and 19% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. The energy of the node
is sometimes saved by not giving a due response to other nodes or by using a blacklisting mechanism. The SOS technique has
comparatively high throughput, minimum delay, and energy consumption. It is due to the core reason that the SOS technique
stimulates the selfish nodes in the network to participate in the network and effectively forward the messages. Comparing the
results with SSAR, here the messages are forwarded on the node contact history and willingness level. The SOS technique takes
some initial time (configuration and loading time) for the arrangements of all the factors involved in the simulation environment.
The values of the simulation are not accurate for the initial two seconds. The values (Throughput and PDR) become consistent
after pause time 2 sec. It can be shown in figure 2 that the performance of SOS is better than the two existing techniques.
The comparison of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 4% selfish nodes for all performance metrics are shown in Table 5. It can be seen
in Table5, the SOS technique gains the highest packet delivery ratios of the packets. At pause time 8 sec, the SOS has the highest
packet delivery ratio of 0.9 (packet sent/rec) that is approximately 25% and 27% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. At
pause time 8 sec, the throughput of SOS is 221 kbps that is 37% and 78% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. At pause time
10 sec, the average delay of SOS is 14.67 ms that is 50% lower than CAIS and 23% lower than SSAR. In addition, the average
energy consumed by SOS is 12.77 joule at pause time 4 sec that is 14% and 19% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively 5.
TABLE 5 Performance comparisons of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 4% selfish nodes
PDR Throughput Avg.Delay Avg.Energy
Pause
time
SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 .4 .68 .31 0.0 134 21.08 0.0 120 440 3.6 15.4 16.3
4 .84 .68 0.7 215 133 33.6 9.0 116 402 12.7 15.6 16.6
6 .93 0.7 .68 218 130 33.2 8.5 116 309 12.9 15.8 17.8
8 .99 0.7 .67 221 130 33.7 8.4 115 263 13.0 16.0 17.0
10 .98 0.7 .62 219.4 126 30.9 14.67 117 242 13.25 16.12 17.2
12 .96 .45 .55 218.9 125 28.61 14.16 117.4 230 13.97 16.24 17.3
14 .95 .48 .55 218.6 126 28.87 14.1 118.1 220 13.53 16.46 17.4
16 .95 .51 .46 218.4 127 25.61 14.05 117.4 211 13.69 16.66 17.5
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(a) Packet Delivery Ratio
 
(b) Throughput
 
(c) Average Delivery Delay
 
(d) Average Energy
FIGURE 2 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 4% of nodes are selfish
4.3.3 Influence of Different Percentage of Selfish Nodes
The performance of SOS is compared with SSAR and CAIS for obtained network properties. The selfish nodes of 10%, 25%,
50%, 75%, and 90% are injected and results are checked for packet delivery ratio, average deliver delay, throughput and average
energy.
By injecting 10% selfish nodes in the network, SOS again outperforms CAIS and SSAR in terms of throughput, packet
delivery, average energy and average delivery delay as shown in Figure 3. At pause time 8 sec, the packet delivery ratio of
SOS is 0.67 (packet sent/rec) that is almost 37% and 31% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 3a. The
throughput of SOS is 204.5 kbps at pause time 4 sec that is 34% and 77% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown
in Figure 3b. In addition, the average delay of SOS is 15.94 ms at pause time 8 sec that is 14% and 38% lower than SSAR and
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(a) Packet Delivery Ratio
 
(b) Throughput
 
(c) Average Delivery Delay
 
(d) Average Energy
FIGURE 3 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 10% of nodes are selfish
CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 3c. Similarly, the average energy consumed by SOS is 3.6 joule at pause time 4 sec that
is 17% and 23% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 3d.
By injecting 25% selfish nodes in the network, the packet delivery ratio and throughput of SOS is higher than CAIS and SSAR
as showed in Figure 4a and 4b. At pause time 6 sec, the packet delivery ratio of SOS is 21% and 42% higher than SSAR and
CAIS respectively. This is because of the fact that monitoring nodes constantly monitored the behavior of selfish nodes in SOS.
At pause time 8 sec, the throughput of SOS is 36% and 79% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. The average delay and
average energy of SOS is much lower than CAIS and SSAR as shown in Figure 4c and 4d. At pause time 4 sec, the average delay
of SOS is 22.5 ms that is 14% lower than SSAR and 41% lower than CAIS. In addition, the average energy consumed by SOS at
pause time 4 sec is 17% lower than SSAR and 20% lower than CAIS. Similarly, the average delay and average energy consumed
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(a) Packet Delivery Ratio
 
(b) Throughput
 
(c) Average Delivery Delay
 
(d) Average Energy
FIGURE 4 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 25% of nodes are selfish
by SOS is lower. Thus, the proposed scheme SOS outperform the both the existing scheme namely SSAR and CAIS in terms
of packet delivery ratio, throughput, average delivery delay, and average energy when there are 25% selfish nodes are present in
the network. This is due to the fact that the nodes in the SSAR and CAIS have a weak social relationship with each other and
hence ignore to forward messages to other members nodes in a community. The comparison of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 25%
selfish nodes for all performance metrics are shown in Table 6.
It can bee seen in Table 6, at pause time 6 sec, the packet delivery ratio of SOS is 21% and 42% higher than SSAR and
CAIS respectively. Similarly, at pause time 16 sec, the packet delivery ratio of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS is .8, .40, .64 that is 40%
and 16% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. This is because of the fact that monitoring nodes constantly monitored the
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TABLE 6 Performance comparisons of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 25% selfish nodes
PDR Throughput Avg.Delay Avg.Energy
Pause
time
SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.4 .68 .12 54 133.5 6.01 0.0 330.6 1395 3.6 15.5 16.2
4 0.6 .60 0.2 209.8 133.6 16.89 8.97 225.3 635.8 12.7 15.7 16.3
6 0.9 .69 .48 217.6 133.5 26.34 9.05 190.2 1144 12.9 16.0 16.5
8 0.9 .60 .56 220.5 132.8 28.93 9.17 177.8 877.7 13.0 16.2 16.6
10 0.9 .42 .48 220.1 132.8 26.28 9.62 177.8 786.9 13.2 16.4 16.7
12 0.9 .31 .49 220.1 132.8 26.42 9.62 177.8 889.0 13.3 16.6 17.0
14 0.8 .31 .62 220.1 121.9 0.31 9.62 168.5 977.4 13.4 16.9 17.4
16 0.8 .40 .64 212.8 123.4 31.41 10.84 159.7 862.9 13.6 17.1 17.7
behavior of selfish nodes in SOS. At pause time 8 sec, the throughput of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS is 220.5 kbps, 132.8 kbps, and
28.93 kbps, that is 36% and 79% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. In addition, At pause time 16 sec, the throughput of
SOS, SSAR, and CAIS is 212.8 kbps, 123.4 kbps, and 31.41 kbps. Thus, is still observed that, the throughput of SOS is 37%
and 75% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Furthermore, the average delay and average energy of SOS is much lower
than CAIS and SSAR. At pause time 4 sec, the average delay of SOS is 22.5 ms that is 14% lower than SSAR and 41% lower
than CAIS. In addition, At pause time 16 sec, the average delay of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS is 10.84 ms, 159.7 ms, and 862.9 that
is 9% lower than SSAR and 56% lower than CAIS. Similarly, the average energy consumed by SOS, SSAR, and CAIS at pause
time 4 sec is 12.7 joules, 15.7 joules, and 16.3 joules respectively. So it is observed that the energy consumed by SOS is 17%
lower than SSAR and 20% lower than CAIS. In addition, the average energy consumed by SOS, SSAR, and CAIS at pause time
16 sec is 13.6 joules, 17.1 joules, and 17.7 joules respectively. So it is observed that the energy consumed by SOS is 20% lower
than SSAR and 22% lower than CAIS.
A similar conclusion can also be drawn by injecting 50% and 75% selfish nodes in the simulation as shown in Figure 5 and
Figure 6.
For 50% selfish nodes in the network, the performance of SOS is better for performance metrics. At pause time 6 sec, the
Packets delivery ratio of SOS is .8 (packet sent/rec) that is 28% and 50% higher than CAIS and SSAR respectively as shown
in Figure 5a. The throughput of SOS is almost 204.76 kbps at pause time 4 sec that is again 32% higher than SSAR and 69%
higher than CAIS as shown in Figure 5b. In addition, the average delay of SOS is 20.1 ms at pause time 8 sec that is 59% lower
than CAIS and 10% lower than SSAR as shown in Figure 5c. Similarly, at pause time 4 sec, the average energy consumed by
SOS is 12.76 joule that is 18% lower than SSAR and 15% lower than CAIS as shown in Figure 5d. The packet delivery ratio of
SOS, CAIS, and SSAR at pause time 6 sec are 0.84, 0.35 and 0.09 (packet sent/rec) respectively as shown in Figure 6a. Thus,
the packet delivery ratio of SOS is 49% and 75% higher than CAIS and SSAR respectively. At pause time 8 sec, the throughput
of SOS is 217.91 kbps that is 43% and 78% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 6b. In addition, the
average delay of SOS at pause time 4 sec is 10.7 ms that is 9% lower than SSAR and 43% lower than CAIS as shown in Figure 6c.
Similarly, at pause time 4 sec, again the average energy consumed by SOS is 12.77 joule that is 17% and 20% lower than SSAR
and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 6d.
By injecting 90% selfish nodes in the network, the SOS scheme still outperforms SSAR and CAIS in terms of packet delivery
ratio, throughput, average delay, and average energy as shown in Figure 7. It can be seen in Figure 7a, at pause time 8 sec,
the packet delivery ratio of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are .86, .48, and .46 that is 38% and 40% higher than SSAR and CAIS
respectively. In addition, at pause time 14 sec, the packet delivery ratio of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are .87, .31, and .41 that is
56% and 46% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Similarly, at pause time 8 sec, the throughput of the SOS, SSAR, and
CAIS scheme are 210.91 kbps, 110.14 kbps, and 32.76 kbps, that is 42% and 74% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively as
shown in Figure 7b. In addition, at pause time 14 sec, the throughput of the SOS, SSAR, and CAIS scheme are 210.37 kbps,
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FIGURE 5 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 50% of nodes are selfish
110.73 kbps, and 34.29 kbps, that is still 41% and 73% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Furthermore, at pause time
8 sec, the average delay of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are 22.72 ms, 139.89 ms, and 967.83 ms, that is 7.3% and 67% lower than
SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 7c. In addition, at pause time 14 sec, the average delay of SOS, SSAR, and
CAIS are 21.27 ms, 134.95 ms, and 551.15 ms, that is still 8% and 38% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively.
Similarly, at pause time 8 sec, the average energy consumed by SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are 13.86 joules, 16.94 joules, and
17.55 joules, that is 17% and 20% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively as shown in Figure 7d. Similarly, at pause time 16
sec, the average energy of SOS is 13.89 joules that is 18% and 21% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively. The comparison
of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 90% selfish nodes for all performance metrics are shown in Table 7.
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FIGURE 6 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 75% of nodes are selfish
It can be seen in Table 7, the packet delivery ratio of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are .86, .48, and .46 that is 38% and 40% higher
than SSAR and CAIS respectively. In addition, at pause time 16 sec, the packet delivery ratio of SOS is .86 that is 65% and 32%
higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Similarly, at pause time 8 sec, the throughput of the SOS, SSAR, and CAIS scheme
are 210.91 kbps, 110.14 kbps, and 32.76 kbps, that is 42% and 74% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. In addition, at
pause time 16 sec, the throughput of the SOS, SSAR, and CAIS scheme are 210.28 kbps, 113.45 kbps, and 34.54 kbps, that is
38% and 73% higher than SSAR and CAIS respectively. In addition, at pause time 8 sec, the average delay of SOS, SSAR, and
CAIS are 22.72 ms, 139.89 ms, and 967.83 ms, that is 7.3% and 67% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Furthermore, at
pause time 16 sec, the average delay of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are 20.14 ms, 134.67 ms, and 499.33 ms, that is 8% and 34%
lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively.
Ghani ET AL 21
(a) Packet Delivery Ratio (b) Throughput
(c) Average Delivery Delay (d) Average Energy
FIGURE 7 Performance comparisons of the algorithms when 90% of nodes are selfish
Similarly, at pause time 8 sec, the average energy consumed by SOS, SSAR, and CAIS are 13.86 joules, 16.94 joules, and
17.55 joules, that is 17% and 20% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively. Similarly, at pause time 16 sec, the average energy of
SOS is 13.89 joules that is 18% and 21% lower than SSAR and CAIS respectively. It is due to the fact that it stimulates the nodes
to participate in the network and forward messages in a cooperative manner in its community. Cooperative nodes are given some
incentive in the form of reputation. The nodes showing selfish behavior are penalized in the form of expulsion from the network.
However, nodes are not directly expelled from the network, it has given a warning first. The two other techniques have not
considered the effect of the selfish nodes on the community. Thus, the results demonstrated in SOS shows that it has encouraged
the nodes in a community to cooperate with all other nodes in message delivery. Therefore, the SOS scheme outperformed
the existing two techniques namely CAIS and SSAR in terms of packet delivery ratio, throughput, average delivery delay, and
average energy consumed.
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TABLE 7 Performance comparisons of SOS, SSAR, and CAIS for 90% selfish nodes
PDR Throughput Avg.Delay Avg.Energy
Pause
time
SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS SOS SSAR CAIS
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.4 .59 .10 53 119.46 6.52 2 129.82 1385.62 3.55 16.47 17.26
4 .65 .60 .20 209.4 111.25 14.9 21.75 155.0 630.54 13.45 16.60 17.34
6 .86 .61 .44 210.12 111.93 21.03 22.28 149.14 1060.18 13.86 16.78 17.55
8 .86 .48 .46 210.91 110.14 32.76 22.72 139.89 967.83 13.86 16.94 17.55
10 .86 .40 .42 210.66 110.16 32.47 21.98 139.19 764.24 13.86 17.09 17.60
12 .86 .28 .41 210.49 108.71 32.94 21.7 139.86 648.28 13.86 17.10 17.60
14 .87 .31 .41 210.37 110.73 34.29 21.27 134.95 551.15 13.89 17.10 17.60
16 .86 .21 .54 210.28 113.45 34.54 20.14 134.67 499.33 13.89 17.10 17.70
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this article, a new SOS scheme is proposed to stimulate the selfish nodes in different communities to cooperatively forward
messages for other nodes. The proposed approach is based on the electoral system and generally omits selfishness in IoT based
SCC. In an electoral system, different heads are elected such as Community Head, Incentive Head and monitoring Head in the
communities. These heads are elected based on two characteristics weight and cooperation. Incentive in the form of reputation
is awarded to the nodes for their cooperation within the community using VCG model. Furthermore, nodes are also penalized
for showing repeated selfish behavior. In the proposed scheme SOS, one of the important rules called the Collective Importance
Factor (CIF) principle is used that decides the selfish and cooperative nature of nodes. This rule computes the trust depends
on evidence from distinct nodes. These evidences are then merged by using the Extended Dempster-Shafer model to resolve
uncertainty situations. For comparative analysis, two protocols namely SSAR and CAIS are thoroughly simulated and analyzed.
The results in terms of data delivery ratio, network delay and average energy consumed are comparedwith the proposed approach.
The results indicate that SOS can possibly accommodate a large number of selfish nodes by enabling them to collaborate in
a community to improve network performance. As a future enhancement of the proposed approach, the bandwidth may be
considered as reputation criteria of nodes in the network for service delivery.
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